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The Free Speech Jurisprudence
of the Rehnquist Court
Nadine Strossen

Introduction
Although the free speech clause has been a part of our Constitution since the Bill of
Rights was ratified in 1791, Supreme Court doctrine regarding the contours of that clause
has a substantially shorter life span, commencing in the second decade of this century
with decisions arising out of the World War I context. The general trend of judicial
decisions during most of that period has been toward greater protection for speech, through
two interrelated developments: expanded judicial definitions of protectible speech, and
stricter judicial scrutiny of measures restricting such speech.'
Recently, however, under the leadership of Chief Justice Rehnquist, with the support
of his so-called "conservative" block,2 the tide has begun to turn in important respects.
Although these trends have deeper roots, they have most prominently come to the fore
during the 1988-89 and 1989-90 Supreme Court terms, the first two in which Justice
Kennedy participated throughout, thus consolidating Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority.
Accordingly, the present essay concentrates on free speech decisions issued during this
period, showing how they have reversed prior patterns of judicial interpretation.
Some observers who criticize the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence for cutting back on
individual rights generally have qualified their criticism by noting that free speech has
fared relatively well. 3 To be sure, two of the most heralded decisions of both relevant
terms-the two that invalidated statutes prohibiting desecration of the U.S. flag--did
adhere to earlier understandings of constitutionally protected expression. 4 However, it
should be stressed that both decisions were issued by a narrow 5-4 majority and authored
by Justice Brennan, 5 who has since resigned from the Court. Moreover, in terms of both
their analysis and their rulings, these two decisions stand sharply apart from many others
in the free speech area. Although the recent speech-eroding cases received less attention
than the widely publicized flag-burning controversies, their long-range impact on First
Amendment jurisprudence is equally significant.
In fundamental-albeit relatively subtle-respects, the Rehnquist Court has reversed
the rights-expanding trend of the Warren and Burger Courts regarding freedom of speech,
much as it has done regarding other individual rights. Given the often indirect methods
by which these decisions have achieved their long-range effect of altering-and truncating---our conceptions of judicially protectible expression, it is especially important to
analyze them closely and to contrast them with prior precedents.
As is generally the case regarding the Court's interpretation of constitutional rights, its
speech-restricting cases have two dimensions: one of process-i.e., the standards that the
The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Jennifer Colyer and Marie Newman.
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Court employs in reviewing claims that these rights have been violated-and one of
substance. This essay analyzes both sets of speech limiting rulings. Although the Rehnquist
Court's substantive holdings more directly and clearly have contracted the scope of free
speech, its process rulings have achieved the same effect indirectly.
Process Rulings Restricting Free Speech
As is true regarding many Rehnquist Court holdings constraining individual rights, the
Court's recent free speech decisions have been important in terms of not only the particular
results reached on the facts at issue, but also the judicial process that led to such resultsi.e., the analytical or methodological standards employed. 6 Although Court watchers have
decried substantive incursions that recent decisions have made on a spectrum of civil
liberties, they have been less alert to this more subtle but ultimately more invidious aspect
of the recent rulings.
No doubt the commentators' relatively sanguine attitude toward the Court's recent
speech decisions is explained in part by this distinction between the bottom-line disposition
of a case and the analysis leading to it. In many recent speech cases, the Court's specific
substantive holdings, in terms of resolving particular factual controversies, were substantially less significant-and hence less alarming-than the general analytical processes by
which the Court reached such results. Yet the Court's resolutions of process issues will
have long-range significance that transcends differing factual contexts. Justice Marshall
noted this phenomenon in his dissenting opinion in Ward v. Rock Against Racism. There,
in the context of upholding regulations on musical performances in a public park, the
Court transformed the criteria for permissible "time, place, and manner" regulations on
expression generally: "Today's decision has significance far beyond the world of rock
music. Government no longer need balance the effectiveness of regulation with the burdens
on free speech. After today, government need only assert that it is most effective to control
speech in advance of its expression." 7 In addition to being couched in relatively unnoticed
language regarding methodological or analytical issues, the adverse long-term impact of
many of the Rehnquist Court's speech-restrictive rulings is camouflaged in two additional
ways as well. First, these decisions routinely assert that they are not reversing prior
decisions that had been more rights-protective. 8 In fact, however, the Rehnquist Court has
significantly limited and, in effect, overruled much prior precedent in the free speech area.
Often, the Court has achieved this result by relying on distinguishable cases or on dicta,
concurring opinions, and even dissenting opinions from past cases. 9 By purporting to
follow past precedent, the Court masks the actual significance of its new "interpretations." 10
Second, as its vehicles for enunciating new, weakened judicial review standards, the
Court often employs cases in which the particular speech claims may not be sympathetic
to many people: for example, Ward v. Rock Against Racism involved the speech rights of
rock musicians performing outdoors in a public park, and Thornburgh v. Abbott" involved
prisoners' communications. It is likely that relatively few people are concerned specifically
about the free speech rights of either loud musicians or convicted felons. No doubt, more
would be concerned if they realized the negative implications that the Court's limitations
on these rights will have upon other forms of expression. Justice Marshall described this
facet of the Ward ruling:
[T]he majority plays to our shared impatience with loud noise to obscure the damage that it does to
our First Amendment rights. Until today, a key safeguard of free speech has been government's
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obligation to adopt the least intrusive restriction necessary to achieve its goals. By abandoning the

requirement that time, place, and manner regulations must be narrowly tailored, the majority replaces
constitutional scrutiny with mandatory deference.' 2

The Rehnquist Court's application of a relaxed judicial review standard to speechinconsistent with the traditional view that free speech is a
limiting measures is squarely
"preferred freedom,"' 3 and consequently that any infringements on it are subject to the
most exacting judicial scrutiny.14 Nevertheless, in several recent speech cases, the Rehnquist Court jettisoned crucial elements of this traditional strict scrutiny and instead
deferred to speech-limiting decisions by executive and legislative branch officials.
One key element of the strict judicial scrutiny traditionally applied to speech-abridging
measures is the demand that any such measure be necessary for promoting the government's countervailing interest.' 5 By contrast, the Rehnquist Court has upheld speechabridging measures that clearly were not necessary to advance the asserted government
ends but rather were at most reasonable or desirable. For example, in Thornburgh v.
Abbott, the Court held that regulations restricting prisoners' receipt of incoming materials
would survive a First Amendment challenge so long as they are "reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests." The Court further held that a prison may exclude materials even if they are not "likely" to lead to violence, so long as the warden determines that
they create an "intolerable risk of disorder.' 6 As another example, in Ward, the Court
held that the government could impose "time, place, and manner" restrictions on speech
are not "substantially broader than necessary" to
or expressive conduct so long as they
17
achieve the government's interest.
In allowing the government to regulate speech on a ground short of necessity, both
Thornburgh and Ward defied earlier precedents which enforced the necessity requirement
generally with respect to any speech regulations. Moreover, both cases defied earlier
Supreme Court rulings that had enforced the general necessity requirement in the specific
factual contexts at issue. 8
Closely related to the Court's increasing refusal to demand that speech-limiting measures
be necessary to promote a government interest is its growing refusal to enforce the
established requirement that the government promote its interest through the measure that
least restricts speech. '9 In both Thornburgh ° and Ward,2' the Court expressly disavowed
this "least restrictive alternative" requirement, although it previously had been enforced
in the specific contexts involved in those cases. Furthermore, the Rehnquist Court expressly
repudiated this requirement in two other free speech cases, which also involved contexts
in which it previously had been enforced: regulations of commercial speech;2 2 and limitations on freedom of association. 23
The Court's reasoning in all these cases is typified by Ward, which ruled that contentneutral regulations on the time, place, or manner of speech should be sustained even if
the government's goals could have been served through less speech-restrictive alternatives .24 Ward upheld New York City's regulations requiring that any musical performance
at the Central Park bandshell had to use city furnished sound equipment run by a city
employed sound technician. The city's asserted justification for this regulation was to
control sound volume.2 5 The city's sound technician controlled not only the sound's
volume, however, but also its "mix," which is an essential aesthetic element of rock
music. 2 6 For this reason, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated the regulations.
Applying the least intrusive alternative approach, the Court of Appeals found that there
volume without also intruding on performers'
were various alternative means of 2controlling
7
ability to control the sound mix.
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In Ward, as in the other cases where the Court discarded the least restrictive alternative
test, it substituted a requirement that the challenged measure be "narrowly tailored" to
promote the relevant interest. The term "narrowly tailored" suggests a test resembling the
least restrictive alternative approach. The Court's explanation of the term, however, makes
clear that it is a nebulous, deferential criterion, which will result in upholding most
government measures.
In Ward, the Court said that the narrow tailoring requirement would be :satisfied "so
long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be

achieved less effectively absent the regulation.28 In other words, the regulation may not
"burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government's legitimate
interests., 29 But, as the dissent noted, "this means that only those regulations that 'engage
in the gratuitous inhibition of expression' will be invalidated."3 ° Moreover, even this
attenuated tailoring requirement probably would not be enforced under the majority's
analysis, because the majority criticized the Second Circuit for evaluating the comparative
efficacy and intrusiveness of the alternative means for achieving noise reduction. 3
Until recently, the fact that a challenged government measure was the least restrictive
alternative for pursuing a government goal did not insulate it from invalidation. In addition,
the extent to which the measure advanced the relevant government goal had to be proportional to and not outweighed by the extent to which it inhibited individual freedom. In
other words, the government's end did not necessarily justify its rights-infringing means .32
Now, however, the Rehnquist Court has inverted these previous holdings: A challenged
measure need not be the least intrusive alternative for advancing the government's goal;
if it effectively promotes the goal, that alone validates it. Nor is the government required
to show that its interest is promoted proportionately to and not outweighed by the curbing
of individual rights. Justice Marshall captured this point in Ward when he said, "the
majority enshrines efficacy but sacrifices free speech." 33
This inversion also characterized the Court's 1990 decision in United States v. Kokinda , which upheld a U.S. Postal Service regulation that banned all solicitation on
public sidewalks adjoining Post Office buildings. Kokinda repeatedly stressed that "[tihe
purpose of the [sidewalk] . . . is to enable the postal service to accomplish the most

efficient and effective postal delivery system. 3 5 According to Kokinda, not only is the
government entitled to utilize the most efficient and effective measures for pursuing its
goals, but also individuals have no rights to government measures that are less restrictive
of their free speech.36
Ward, Kokinda, and other Rehnquist Court decisions constitute striking reversals of
classic principles governing speech on public property. Under the established approach,
the government could be required to make some sacrifice in the efficiency with which it
pursued its goals, because it had to utilize the measures that least restricted individual
expression. For example, in the venerable decision of Schneiderv. State,37 the Court held

that the government could not pursue its goal of maintaining litter-free streets by banning
leafletting. Rather, the Court held, the government had to utilize a measure that was less
intrusive on speech, such as punishing those who engaged in littering, even if that measure
was less effective in accomplishing the government's goal. In short, free speech was
deemed more important that government efficiency.
Another aspect of the Rehnquist Court's drift toward relaxed scrutiny of government
action curtailing speech is its failure to require that any such action be undertaken pursuant
to clearly delineated standards, in order to circumscribe official discretion. In two recent
cases, the Court expressly permitted the government to limit speech pursuant to open-
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ended, broadly worded standards that left much room for the exercise-and hence for the
abuse-of governmental discretion.
In Ward, the Court upheld New York City's guidelines for regulating outdoor music
performances even though it recognized that the standards were "undoubtedly flexible,"
and that "the officials implementing them will exercise considerable discretion."38 As
Justice Marshall noted in dissent, this broad discretion was particularly problematic for
two reasons. First, it would afford officials leeway to engage in content-based regulation
under the guise of making ostensibly neutral judgments about volume.3 9 He pointed out
that, throughout history, newer styles of music generally have been perceived as "noisier"
than older styles, with the result that content could be censored on the pretext of regulating
volume. 40
A second reason why the detailed legal standards requirement should have been enforced
especially zealously in Ward, Justice Marshall explained, is that the guidelines constituted
a prior restraint on expression. 4' Prior restraints long have been considered especially
threatening to free speech values. Thus, they are viewed as presumptively unconstitutional
and upheld only if they satisfy several prerequisites that the Court has enunciated. These
prerequisites are so strictly enforced that almost no prior restraints have passed constitutional muster.42
Yet, despite the fact that the regulations upheld in Ward imposed prior restraints on expression, the Rehnquist Court did not subject them to the strict scrutiny appropriate for such
serious invasions of First Amendment liberties. In particular, it failed to enforce one established prerequisite for validating a prior restraint: that it regulate speech only pursuant to
"narrowly drawn. . . and definite standards for the [administering] officials to follow. '43
Notwithstanding the general and vague terms of the Ward guidelines, however, the Court
upheld them. 44 The Court did not insist that the regulations themselves explicitly limit official
discretion. Instead, it was content to rest its approval upon the officials' testimony that, in
practice, they interpreted the regulations' broad standards relatively narrowly. 45 This rationale is at odds with the Court's established stance toward prior restraints. It had consistently
ruled that a regulation whose terms were insufficiently narrow could not be saved by allegedly
46
limiting interpretations that were consigned to the discretion of official enforcers.
Thornburgh v. Abbott also abandoned the previous requirement that government action
limiting speech may be undertaken only pursuant to specific, detailed standards. There,
the Court upheld regulations that gave prison officials broad discretion to control prisoners'
receipt of publications and other materials if they determined that such materials might be
"detrimental to the security, good order, or discipline of the institution or if they might
facilitate criminal activity., 47 As the dissent noted, these "standards" are so ambiguous
that they give prison officials virtually free rein to censor incoming materials.48
Yet another aspect of the strict scrutiny that the Court traditionally has applied to
speech-infringing measures, which it recently has jettisoned, is the requirement that the
government interest promoted by such measures must be very important. To capture this
49
concept, the Court has said that such an interest must be of "compelling" significance.
Recently, however, the Rehnquist Court has displayed a tendency to approve speech
infringements on the rationale that they advance government interests that are merely
"legitimate" rather than "compelling."
Alternatively, the Court achieves the same result by conclusorily labeling as "compelling" government interests that traditionally have not been considered to rise to that level
of importance. For example, in Thornburgh, the Court sustained prison regulations that
significantly abridged prisoners' speech rights on the basis of administrative convenience,5°
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a government interest that never before had been deemed sufficiently important to justify
limiting speech. 5' Indeed, the Court previously had ruled that administrative convenience
did not justify limiting even less fundamental rights.52
The foregoing specific respects in which the Rehnquist Court has reduced the strict
degree of judicial scrutiny traditionally applied to speech-limiting measures constitute
manifestations of its general proclivity to defer broadly to the challenged determinations of
executive and legislative branch officials who adopt such measures. The Court essentially
presumes such decisions to be correct and imposes substantial burdens of proof upon
individuals who challenge them. As previously noted, the two recent flag-burning decisions
reaffirmed traditional free speech principles and thus stand as important counter-examples
to the other cases discussed in this essay as well. In holding that legislation criminalizing
flag desecration violates free speech principles regardless of the fact that a majority of
Americans apparently support such legislation, Justice Brennan's majority opinions rejected Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting view of the Court's appropriate role. In urging
judicial deference to majoritarian decisions, the Chief Justice declared: "Surely one of the
high purposes of a democratic society is to legislate against conduct that is regarded as
evil and profoundly offensive to the majority of people. . . .
This statement is starkly inconsistent with prior Supreme Court pronouncements regarding the Court's role in reviewing speech-abridging measures.54 Nonetheless, it is consistent
with the weakened judicial scrutiny that the Court recently has applied to other speechrestricting measures, aside from statutes banning flag desecration, Such a deferential stance
was maintained, for example, in Kokinda, which upheld regulations of speech on public
property adjoining Post Offices; 55 in Thornburgh, which upheld prison regulations of
inmates' correspondence and their receipt of publications; 56 in Ward, which upheld municipal regulations controlling the volume and sound mix of musical performances in a public
park; 57 and in Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox, which upheld
a public university's regulations on commercial speech. 58 This aspect of the foregoing
decisions was aptly summarized by Justice Marshall when 59he stated that "the majority
replaces constitutional scrutiny with mandatory deference.,
Substantive Rulings Restricting Free Speech
Paralleling its invocation of weakened judicial review standards in free speech cases,
the Rehnquist Court's substantive holdings have diminished the scope of protectible free
speech. One important way in which the Court achieves this reduction is that, construing
the free speech clause, it increasingly overemphasizes notions of formal equality. The
Court reads this constitutional provision as securing for every individual opportunities to
engage in expressive activities that are formally equal to other persons' opportunities. The
Court has retreated from previous readings of the clause as absolutely guaranteeing the
right to engage in some expressive activities.
The equal protection clause bars governmental discrimination regarding specific constitutional rights, including freedom of speech. Therefore, to read those guarantees as
merely assuring non-discrimination is to render them superfluous, devoid of independent,
substantive content.
The tendency of the Rehnquist Court's free speech jurisprudence to exaggerate egalitarian concepts of relative protection, at the expense of libertarian concepts of absolute
protection, is graphically illustrated by its decisions concerning the "public forum doctrine," governing speech on public property. This essay will focus on one such decision
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from the Court's 1989-90 term, United States v. Kokinda. 60 The Kokinda case construes
the First Amendment as guaranteeing only that invasions of free speech will not be made
on an overtly or intentionally discriminatory basis. It does not, however, construe the First
Amendment either as prohibiting all such invasions outright or as prohibiting any such
invasions that are discriminatory in effect.
In Kokinda, the Court continued its recent application of the public forum doctrine to
allow the government to deny access or to terminate previously granted access to public
property for expressive purposes. The only limitation on the government's prerogatives
in this area is that it must not deny or terminate the expressive use of its property solely
for reasons that overtly discriminate against particular speakers or messages. 61
To be sure, the free speech clause protects against discriminatory as well as unjustified
denials of expressive opportunities. Yet, in its public forum decisions, the Rehnquist Court
has overemphasized the First Amendment's relative guarantee of equal access to public
property for expressive purposes and ignored its absolute guarantee of some such access.
In effect, the Court has said that the only right an individual has is not to be given less
protection than other individuals, but that all may be equally unprotected. 62 Furthermore,
the Court employs a formalistic notion of equality, which prohibits facially discriminatory
government regulations but tolerates other regulations that are discriminatory in effect.
Therefore, the Court does not even ensure equal non-protection, let alone equal protection,
of free speech rights on public property.
Ironically, the public forum doctrine-which the Rehnquist Court has applied to diminish speech rights-initially was introduced into First Amendment jurisprudence as a
vehicle for expanding expressive liberties .63 The basic idea was that on certain types of
public property, such as streets, parks, and sidewalks, the government had to grant access
to speech and other expressive activities. As originally enunciated, the public forum
doctrine encapsulated a basic libertarian proposition: i.e., that all individuals have an
absolute right of access to certain government property for expressive purposes (subject
to neutral "time, place and manner restrictions"). 64 Early on, the Court recognized an
egalitarian corollary to that basic libertarian proposition: that the government could not
deny access to its property, for expressive purposes, on the basis of the speaker's identity
65
or message.
Recently, the Court has distorted the public forum doctrine into guaranteeing not any
absolute, minimal degree of free speech access to government property, but instead only
an equal or relative degree of access. The government has no absolute obligation to make
its property available for expressive purposes to any speaker, the Court says. Rather, the
government's sole obligation arises only if it voluntarily chooses to open a particular piece
of property for some expressive purposes. Then and only then, says the Court, does
government incur the obligation not to discriminate among speakers or messages. In other
words, the government must simply treat all would-be speakers alike. If it grants access
to some, it must not deny access to others on a manifestly discriminatory basis. But it
need not grant access to any.66 Moreover, government may deny access on a basis that
effectively discriminates against certain speakers or ideas.
The Court's regression in construing the public forum doctrine can be schematically
outlined as follows:
Libertarianproposition:The government must grant access to its property for expressive
purposes.
Egalitariancorollary: The government must not deny access to its property for expressive purposes on discriminatory bases.
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Reductionistredefinition: The government may deny access to its property for expressive
purposes on non-discriminatory bases.
Kokinda epitomizes the Court's "equal non-protection" approach to the public forum
doctrine. In what Justice Brennan aptly labelled a "farce" of the intendedly speechprotective public forum doctrine,67 the Kokinda opinion twisted that doctrine into a basis
for denying speech rights on a type of government property that-along with streets and
parks-traditionally had been deemed a "quintessential" or "inherent" public forum: a
public sidewalk. 68
In a model of a boot-strapping argument, the Court "reasoned" that because the U.S.
Postal Service had issued a regulation prohibiting any solicitation on sidewalks adjoining
Post Office buildings, such sidewalks should be classified as "nonpublic forums," where
the government could freely enforce almost any restriction on access for expressive
purposes. In other words, the government could deny access to speech because it had
denied such access! 69
The Kokinda Court imposed only two minimal limitations on the government's power
to impose speech restrictions on sidewalks adjoining Post Offices or other public property
classified as nonpublic forums: such restrictions had to be "reasonable," and they could
not constitute "an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the
speaker's view., 70 Thus, the government apparently may "suppress expression" on such
property "because public officials oppose the speaker's view," so long as that is not the
officials' only motivation.
Not only did the Kokinda opinion relegate the precious free speech liberty to the minimal
degree of protection afforded by rational basis review, but also, even worse, it applied
that standard in a particularly lackluster fashion, manifesting substantial deference to the
determinations of the U.S. Postal Service and effectively presuming those determinations
to be constitutionally correct. Thus, Kokinda also demonstrates the integral interconnection
between the Court's weakened review standards and its diminished substantive concept
concerning free speech.
As the Kokinda dissent noted, even assuming arguendo that the Postal regulations were
appropriately reviewed under a rational basis standard, it still should have been invalidated,
because it was unreasonable. Of particular significance, the regulation was unreasonable
in its discrimination among types of speech and speakers. In contrast with its categorical
ban on solicitation, the Postal Service "does not subject to the same categorical prohibition
many other types of speech presenting the same risk of disruption .

. .,

such as soapbox

oratory, pamphleteering, distributing literature for free, or even flag-burning., 71 In fact,
as the dissent observes, those who solicit money may well be less likely to cause disruption
in the Post Office Services than those who engage in permitted types of speech.7 2
This irrational inconsistency in the Postal Service rule upheld in Kokinda illustrates how
the Court's sterile overemphasis on formal equality strips constitutional guarantees of real
meaning. The Court purports to preserve in the public forum doctrine at least the protection
against the discriminatory exclusion of some speech, if not a more absolute protection
against the exclusion of any speech. Yet, by deferring to government regulators and
presuming their speech restrictions to be "reasonable," the Court approves restrictions
that, in actual effect, do discriminate against certain categories of speakers and certain
types of messages, without any rational justification.
In other recent public forum cases, the Court even has gone so far as to sustain
restrictions that discriminated against certain viewpoints, the central evil that the free
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speech clause guards against. 73 For example, in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and
EducationalFund,7 4 the Court held that an annual charitable fund-raising drive conducted
in the Federal workplace during working hours was not a limited public forum, although
for almost 20 years it had been open to any tax-exempt, nonprofit, charitable organization
that was supported by public contributions and provided direct health and welfare services
to individuals. The Court therefore applied only minimal scrutiny to a 1983 Executive
Order, which for the first time excluded from the fund-raising drive "[a]gencies that seek
to influence the outcomes of elections or the determination of public policy through
political activity or advocacy, lobbying, or litigation on behalf of parties other than
themselves."75 The Court held that the exclusion of advocacy groups survived the lowlevel scrutiny it deemed applicable, reasoning that the avoidance of controversy is a
valid ground for restricting speech in a nonpublic forum. 76 As the Cornelius dissenters
maintained, this exclusion was patently viewpoint-based.77
Another case in which the Court permitted the government to discriminate against
particular viewpoints in regulating speech on public property is Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association.78 In Perry, the Court held that public school
mail facilities did not constitute a limited public forum, even though they were open to a
union that had been certified as the teachers' exclusive bargaining representative, had
previously been open to a rival union, and had periodically been open to civic and church
organizations. 79 Because of its conclusion that these facilities constituted a nonpublic
forum, the Court held that the school could bar the rival union from using them. Yet, as
the dissenters noted, this selective exclusion constituted viewpoint discrimination which
should be prohibited even in a nonpublic forum.80
It seems incredible that the intendedly speech-protective public forum doctrine was
applied in the two foregoing cases, which allowed the government to restrict speakers'
access to government property based on their viewpoints. This dramatically demonstrates
the Court's recent distortion of the doctrine. Although the Rehnquist Court has reduced
the public forum doctrine to a guarantee of formal non-discrimination or equality, the Court
is not even adequately protecting equality values. It tolerates arbitrary and discriminatory
restrictions on speech as well as unjustified restrictions.
Conclusion
"Not with a bang, but a whimper," 81 the Rehnquist Court has reversed the momentum
of previous Courts toward expanded protection for speech. To be sure, the Court has
issued some significant decisions that are consistent with that previous protective trend,
and its speech-restricting decisions have received relatively little attention. Nevertheless,
it is important to analyze the rulings that undermine free speech precisely because so many
are issued in contexts designed to obscure their import.
These speech-limiting rulings have far reaching consequences beyond the factual settings
directly involved, since they have eviscerated the strict scrutiny traditionally applied to
measures encroaching on speech. Eschewing the Supreme Court's established role as the
guarantor of individual liberties-including the paramount liberty of free expression-the
Rehnquist Court increasingly has deferred to judgments of majoritarian governmental
branches in support of speech-limiting measures.
Paralleling its deferential scrutiny-or, more accurately, "non-scrutiny"'--of government measures abridging speech, the Rehnquist Court has constricted its conception of
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the scope of protected speech. Kokinda and other recent public forum decisions abandon
established views of the free speech clause as ensuring some absolute level of protection
for expression. Rather, they espouse a diminished view of this constitutional provision as
ensuring only that individuals will not be subjected to patent, intentional discrimination
in the level of protection-or lack of protection-they receive. Thus, after Kokinda, none
of us has the right to engage in expressive activity on government property. Instead, we
must be content in the knowledge that the government may not single us out in denying
expressive access to its property solely because it disagrees with our ideas.
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